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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-2264
___________
SHAWN MARTIN FINCH,
                          Appellant
v.
CAMBRIA COUNTY PRISON
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-00330)
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________________________________
Submitted by the Clerk for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 10, 2010
Before:  BARRY, FISHER and GREENAWAY, Circuit Judges.
(Filed:  October 6, 2010)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Shawn Martin Finch, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District
Court’s dismissal of his civil action.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily
affirm the judgment of the District Court.
2Finch initiated the underlying action in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania on December 29, 2009, by filing a motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).  Attached to the motion was a one-page proposed
complaint naming Cambria County Prison as the defendant, and “federal question, 28
U.S.C. Section1331” as the source of jurisdiction.  The complaint alleged only that a
prison guard gave the coroner the wrong identification card to proceed with an autopsy. 
Based on this, Finch claimed that he suffered defamation, anxiety, mental anguish,
traumatic stress, and various physical and psychological ailments.
The Court concluded that there was no basis for it to assert subject matter
jurisdiction from the face of the complaint and, therefore, issued an order dismissing the
action for lack of jurisdiction and denying the motion to proceed IFP as moot.  Finch then
filed a more thorough IFP application and added facts to his proposed complaint.  His
filing was docketed as a “motion for reconsideration.”  According to his revised
complaint, on September 22, 2006, while he was incarcerated at Cambria County Prison,
the inmate in the cell next to his committed suicide.  Finch alleged that the coroner
mistakenly conducted the autopsy and issued the death certificate under Finch’s name. 
Finch claimed that this violated his rights under the Eighth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments and constituted unconstitutional discrimination.
While his “motion for reconsideration” was pending, Finch filed a notice of appeal
in this Court.  The District Court subsequently granted Finch’s motion, vacated its order
3dismissing the action, granted his motion to proceed IFP, and referred the matter to the
Magistrate Judge for further proceedings.  The Magistrate Judge held that the prison itself
could not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior, that Finch failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, and that even if he could, his claim would
likely be time-barred.  The District Court adopted the Report & Recommendation as the
opinion of the Court and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.
Because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the
judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  After granting a
litigant leave to proceed IFP, the District Court is required to dismiss his complaint if it
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
For the reasons given by the District Court, we agree that Finch’s complaint failed to
allege any actionable violation of his constitutional rights and that any amendment would
be futile.  See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).  Based on the
foregoing, we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question and, therefore,
will summarily affirm.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  Finch’s motion to proceed
IFP on appeal is granted.
